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FELA REVISITED*
by
VERNON X. MILLER"*
Some schemes of social legislation can live too long. They cannot be revital-
ized by amendments or additions. The signs are many that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act is that kind of statute.
Fifty years ago Congress tried to reach farther with FELA than the judges were
willing to follow.1 Abolishing the fellow-servant rule and adding comparative
negligence to some work-injury cases affecting railroad employees does not smack
now of drastic social legislation. Originally FELA included more than those two
ideas,2 but they were, and they still are, the heart of the scheme. In 1908 the Court
warned Congress to restrict this remedial tort statute to instances where railroad
workmen were engaged in interstate commerce when they were hurt.' Thereafer
in a second statute Congress reduced the scheme to satisfy the Court's demands.'
Then the Court decided that interstate commerce in the second statute meant
transportation," and that the scheme of comparative negligence did not include
instances where the carrier's defense was the assuming of a risk.6
Nowadays we know that the regulatory powers of Congress over interstate
commerce are comprehensive. Congress can regulate employment relations in
* Much has been written on the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Recently a Symposium
on the statutes and the case law was published in Volume 18 of Law and Contemporary
Problems. Several papers on the subject are published in Volume 36 of the Cornell Law
Quarterly. In this comment I am supplementing two of my articles, and I am borrowing
from Professor Beale for the title. See Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HARe. L. REV.
417.
* * Dean, School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
1 The First Federal Employers' Liability Act was enacted on June 11, 1906. 34 STAT.
232.
2 Even under the Act of 1908 a violation of safety appliance regulations was like
statutory negligence, and assumption of risk was not a defense. Cf. Act of April 22, 1908,
c. 149, sec. 4, 34 STAT. 66; 45 U.S.C. §54 (1952); Tait, Making Democracy Safer for
Railway Servants-How Toilers on Rails Broadened the Constitution, 10 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 272 (1942).
s The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
4 The Second Act was approved on April 22, 1908. 35 STAT. 65. See 45 U.S.C. §51
et seq. (1952). This statute was upheld in the Supreme Court. The Second Employers'
Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
5 Shanks v. Delaware, Lack & West. R., 239 U.S. 556 (1916). See Justice Van
Devanter's well known quotation on p. 558: "the true test of employment in such com-
merce is, was the employee at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or
in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it." See Sutherland, J., in
Chicago & N.W. v. Bolle 284 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1931).
6 Toledo, St. L. & W. R. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165 (1928); Delaware, Lack. & West R.
v. Koske, 279 U.S. 7 (1929). See Butler, J., in Delaware, Lack. & West R. v. Koske on
p. 11: "Defendant was not bound to maintain its yard in the best or safest condition; it
transportation and in the production of goods for interstate commerce.7 Within
ten years after Congress enacted the second Federal Employers' Liability Act the
Supreme Court upheld workmen's compensation.8 In the compensation cases con-
stitutional objections related rather to limitations of due process on plenary state
powers than to the scope of delegated powers over areas of commerce, but the
Court did permit state legislatures to reach far with schemes of social legislation.
The judges hedged a bit when they decided that legislatures could not bring
longshoremen or harbor workers under a state compensation program,9 but they
clinched the case for a comprehensive work-injury statute in 1922 and 1923.
State compensation schemes, the Court said, do not depend on contract,10 and
they do not have to be restricted to hazardous occupations."
During the years between 1917 and 1923 the judges were adding legalisms 2
to the story of FELA. When a railroad workman was engaged in interstate trans-
portation at the time of his injury, he had to sue for damages in tort under the
federal act. That was the thesis of New York Central Railroad v. Winfield,"s and
it is a doctrine to be reckoned with today. The pinpoint test for transportation
and interstate commerce at the time of injury was biting into the possibilities for
relief under FELA. But that biting did leave open to state regulation under com-
pensation schemes a substantial number of railroad work-injury cases.14
had much freedom in the selection of methods to drain its yard and in the choice of facili-
ties and places for the use of its employees. Courts will not prescribe standards in respect
of such matters or leave engineering questions such as are involved in the construction and
maintenance of railroad yards and the drainage systems therein to the uncertain and vary-
ing judgment of juries."
7 The National Labor Relations Act: 49 STAT. 449 (1935); Labor Board v. Jones &
Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 34 (1937); Santa Cruz Co. v. Labor Board, 303 U.S. 453 (1938);
The Fair Labor Standards Act: 52 STAT. 1060 (1938); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
s On the same decision day in March, 1917, the Court upheld the limited compulsory
statute of New York (New York Central R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188); the voluntary pressure
scheme of Iowa (Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210); and the compulsory class insurance
compensation statute of Washington State (Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243
U.S. 219).
9 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Much of the sting has been
removed from Jensen. There is a federal compensation statute now for longshoremen and
harbor workers [44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §901 et. seq. (1952)] and difficulties
in allocating an injured harbor worker to the right program, state or federal, where there
is a possibility of doubt, have been resolved by the Court in Davis v. Department of Labor
[314 U.S. 244 (1941)].
10 Cudahy Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923). See Sutherland, J., on p. 423:
"Workmen's Compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that of
implied contract; that is, upon the conception that the injured workman is enitled to com-
pensation for an injury sustained in the service of an industry to whose operations he con-
tributes his work as the owner contributes his capital-the one for the sake of the wages
and the other for the sake of the profits."
"Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922).
12 A legalism is a doctrinal development or statutory interpretation on the level of
judge-made law. It is a policy choice with a restrictive effect. Literally it is consistent with
the taught law, but the choice could have been different. Usually lawmen are sophisticated
enough to reconcile legalisms with the traditions about government of laws.
Is244 U.S. 147 (1917).
14 See Miller, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 2 LOYOLA L. REV.
138, 152-153 (1944).
Thirty years after the second act was passed Congress tried to erase some of
the legalisms which the Court had developed. In 1939 the act was amended to
relieve litigants from the pinpoint test and to extend the area of comparative
negligence to all instances of affirmative defenses. 5 Basically the scheme of the
statute remained the same. Literally Congress did not touch the Winfield doctrine.
Congress increased substantially the quantity of instances in which plaintiffs
could be successful. Although that is a long way from workmen's compensation,
perhaps most injured railroad workmen have been happier under the amended
statute than they would be under compensation. When a workman has a good
tort case the prize can be high.
The trends in the case law since 1939 have pointed to expansive interpreta-
tions. 6 This is true especially in the assumption-of-risk cases.17 If the risks of
railroading can be reduced, the Court has held, there is evidence of negligence."i
Comparisons of fault between a plaintiff's conduct and the non-feasances or mis-
feasances of the company's personnel must be resolved by the fact-finders.' 9 The
Court has accepted as sufficient instances depending on circumstantial factors which
it would have rejected before 1939.20
Literally under the 1939 amendment it is vital to inquire only whether some
of the duties of the injured employee have pertained to the furthering of inter-
state commerce. Abolishing the pinpoint test has reduced inquiry into what the
employee was doing when he was injured.2' It has been obvious to the judges
that the amendment of 1939 was intended to be remedial. Many more plaintiffs
and more classes of plaintiffs have been successful since 1939 than in the years
before,2 2 but the judges are still groping to discover the boundaries of the pro-
15Act of August 11, 1939, 53 STAT. 1404; 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1952).
"I See Edwards v. Baltimore & 0. R., 131 F (2) 366 (C. A. 7th, 1942); Erwin v.
Pennsylvania R., 36 F. Supp. 936 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Maxies v. Gulf, M. & 0. R., 358
Mo. 1190, 219 S. W. (2) 322, 10 A L R. (2) 1273 (1949). See Miller, An Interpretation
of the Act of 1939 (PELA), 18 L. & C. P. 241, 245-246 (1953).
'7Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
18 Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1948); cf. Sadowski v. Long Island R., 292
N. Y. 448, 55 N. E. (2) 497 (1944). This standard is a long step from absolute liability.
Sometimes verdicts are directed for carriers, and judgments for carriers are affirmed. See
Herdman v. Pennsylvania R., 25 L. W. 4117 (1957); Miller, An Interpretation of the Act
of 1939 (FELA), 18 L. & C. P. 241, 246 (1953).
19 Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1948). Of immediate interest are four cases
decided in the Supreme Court on February 25, 1957. In three of the cases decisions of inter-
mediate courts adverse to the employees' claims were reversed. In one case an adverse de-
cision was affirmed. In the three cases the Court reversed judgments for the carriers because
there was evidence of negligence on both sides. The Court said that only the jury could
reduce the evidence through comparisons of fault into verdicts for or against the carriers.
Reversed: Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R., 25 L. W. 4113; Webb v. Illinois Central R., 25 L. W.
4116; Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines Inc., 25 L. W. 4118 (Jones Act). Affirmed:
Herdman v. Pennsylvania R., 25 L. W. 4117.
2 0 Before 1939: Coogan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. 271 U.S. 472 (1926).
After 1939: Bailey v. Central of Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); Tennant v. Peoria &
Pekin U. R., 321 U.S. 29 (1944).
21 See Atlantic Coast Line R. v. Meeks, 30 Tenn. App. 520, 208 S.W. (2) 355 (1947)
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 827 (1948).
22 See Miller, An Interpretation of the Act of 1939 (FELA), 18 L. & C. P. 241,
245-246 (1953); Miller, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 2 LOYOLA
L. REv. 138 154-155 (1944); cf. cases cited in n. 15, supra.
gram. What kinds of railroad employees are included in the statute, and how does
this extending of the scheme affect the processing of claims for compensation
under state law?
A reading of the 1939 amendment to include almost all railroad employees is
not inconsistent with the text. Nevertheless, the story of the case law under the
statute suggests something different, although lawmen generally will concede that
Congress can prescribe some kind of work-injury program for all employees of
interstate railroads whenever it chooses. The specter of Winfield has been hanging
over judges to make them cautious. A broad reading of the 1939 Act will cut
into the compensation area unless the judges are willing to confine the Winfield
doctrine to the case law of the period before 1939.
Certainly under the 1939 amendment it is not important to determine
whether a trainman was engaged in interstate commerce when he was hurt. No
longer is it necessary to find out, for example, whether he was switching interstate
or intrastate cars.2" Under the clause of the first section with the broad language
"any part of whose duties shall be in the furtherance of interstate or foreign com-
merce", all railroaders employed by interstate carriers can qualify as plaintiffs.
In one of the first state court cases decided after 1939 the New York Court of
Appeals concluded that the amendment was devised to cover back of shop em-
ployees.24 Those are the men who work with tools and supplies and machines that
are used in the servicing of railroad equipment. It is well recognized now that
railroaders, back of shop employees and workmen engaged on new installations,
are covered under the statute as it stands.25 But there are many other railroad
employees, such as custodians, clerks, solicitors and all kinds of white-collar
workers, including officials of the railroads. There are some cases where these other
kinds of employees have been successful as plaintiffs or have been denied com-
pensation. The list is not long and the principal question is still unanswered: how
big is FELA?
Among those other injured employees are the following: a tie inspector who
was injured when he fell from a loading platform while he was inspecting ties, 2 6
a traveling freight solicitor in the white-collar class, 27 a waybill pickup boy,28 an
23 See Erwin v. Pennsylvania R., 36 F. Supp. 936 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). Under the old
law, see Harrington v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 32, 83 P. (2) 270 (1938), on
rehearing, 96 Utah 544, 88 P. (2) 548 (1939).24 Baird v. New York Central R., 299 N.Y. 213, 86 N.E. (2) 567 (1949), rev'g
Baird v. New York Central R., 274 App. Div. 577, 86 N. Y. S. (2) 54 (3d dept. 1948).
25 Back of shop employees: Edward v. Baltimore & 0. R., 131 F. (2) 366 (C.A. 7th,
1942); Baird v. New York Central R., supra n. 23; Maxies v. Gulf, Mobile & 0. R., 358
Mo. 1100, 219 S. W. (2) 322, 10 A. L. R. (2) 1273 (1949); Jordan v. Baltimore & 0. R.,
135 W. Va. 183, 62 S. E. (2) 806 (1950). Railroaders: this is the obvious category in-
cluding almost everyone engaged in transportation; see, for example, Missouri Pac. R. v.
Fisher, 206 Ark. 705, 177 S. W. (2) 725 (1944). New construction: Agostino v. Penn-
s yvania R., 50 F. Supp. 726 (E. D. N. Y. 1943); but cf. Moser v. Union Pac. R., 65 Idaho
79, 147 P. (2) 336 (1944) (where court interpreted the new amendment strictly to save
a workman's claim for compensation). And see Shelton v. Thompson, 148 F. (2) 1 (C.A.
7th, 1945) (plaintiff was a storehouse custodian).
26 Erickson v. Southern Pacific Co., 39 Cal. (2) 374, 246 P. (2) 642 (1952).27 Kettner v. Industrial Comm., 258 Wis. 615, 46 N. W. (2) 833 (1951).28 Bowers v. Wabash R., 246 S.W. (2) 535 (Mo. App. 1952).
assistant timekeeper who worked in the general offices where he inspected all
of the company's payrolls,2" a woman clerk in a freight yard office3 ° and a clerk
in charge of the blueprint files for all of the structures and equipment on the
company's lines." The cases about the traveling freight agent and the waybill
pickup boy were compensation claims. Both employees were victims in traffic
accidents. In both cases state court judges decided against the claimants because
of the Winfield doctrine. Winfield did not suggest caution to these judges. They
read much into the new amendment, and they let Winfield crush the claimants'
chances. 2 In the other instances the courts read the 1939 amendment generously
to help the injured employees. All of them had prima facie cases sufficient to
support claims for damages in tort.
There is language in some of the opinions to suggest a broad interpretation
to include almost all railroad employees.3 Usually the judges concede that Con-
gress has not covered every railroad employee.3 4 Sometimes it is more than a con-
cession. "A train does not travel on a freight claim." So said Judge Yankwich in
Holl v. Southern Pacific Company 5 when he decided against a plaintiff who was
a file clerk in the freight claims department of the company's general offices. She
had been injured while she was being extricated from a stalled elevator in the
office building. Of course the corollary of this decision is that a person like this
plaintiff may qualify as a compensation claimant if employees in her class are
covered under a state statute and if time has not run against the processing of
her claim.
The most important case on the list is the one about the file clerk who was
the custodian of the railroad's blueprints. That case reached the United States
Supreme Court.80 It represents the Court's one contribution to the case law in
29 Straub v. Reading Co., 220 F. (2) 177 (C. A. 3d, 1955).
8OLillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947) rev'g Lillie v. Thompson, 162 F. (2)
716 (C. A. 7th, 1947); Lillie v. Thompson, 173 F. (2) 481 (C. A. 6th, 1949).
81 Reed v. Pennsylvania R., 351 U.S. 502 (1956) rev'g Reed v. Pennsylvania R.,
227 F. (2) 810 (C. A. 3d, 1955).
32 The instances are many in which back of shop employees have been denied com-
pensation. Baird v. New York Central R., 299 N. Y. 213, 86 N. E. (2) 567 (1949);
Trucco v. Erie R., 353 Pa. Super. 320, 45 A. (2) 20 (1946); Reader v. Pennsylvania R.,
113 Ind. App. 518, 49 N. E. (2) 387 (1945); Albright v. Pennsylvania R., 183 Md.
421, 37 A. (2) 870 (1944); Williams v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 155 Kan. 813, 130 P.
(2) 596 (1942); Southern Pacific Co. v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 19 Cal. (2) 271, 120 P. (2)
880 (1942).
8 See Biggs, C. J., dissenting in Reed v. Pennsylvania R., 227 F. (2) 810, 814:
"As was pointed out by the Superior Court of Pensylvania . . . the amending language
'is very comprehensive, so inclusive indeed that most railroad employees come within its
scope.' Such a result may be unfortunate (quaere: because of Winfield?) but seems to have
been the intention of Congress."
34The plaintiff's lawyer conceded in the Reed case that the amended statute does not
include all railroad employees. Perhaps it is significant that the list of cases is short where
railroad employees are neither railroaders nor back of shop workmen. Lawyers have hesi-
tated to claim too much.
35 71 F. Supp. 21 (N. D. Calif. 1947).
36 Reed v. Pennsylvania R., 351 U.S. 502 (1956).
this area.37 The plaintiff worked in the general offices of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road ip Philadelphia. The blueprints were plans for buildings, machines and roll-
ing stock located at many places on the company's lines. The clerk was injured in
her office when a cracked window pane was blown upon her during a high wind.
Her case was presented on the theory that her employer had not afforded her a
safe place to work. The trial judge and the majority in the court of appeals de-
cided against the plaintiff's case on jurisdictional grounds.38 She could not qualify
under FELA, and there was not the required diversity of citizenship for a common
law tort action in a federal court.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. In one of
his last cases Mr. Justice Minton wrote the opinion of the court. It was obvious
to the majority of five that a plaintiff under FELA does not have to be a railroader
or a shop employee. Although Congress could have included all railroad em-
ployees under the statute, Mr. Justice Minton agreed that this act is not open
to that interpretation. Nevertheless, the amendment was directed toward some-
thing more than the abolishing of the pinpoint transportation test. Although fur-
therance of commerce does not include everything which interstate railroad em-
ployees may do, the Court decided that such commerce does include duties which
relate to the keeping of the system's blueprints. Perhaps the Court could not have
given a different kind of answer, but this is an administrative decision. It solves
the plaintiff's problem in this case. Perhaps it indicates something of a probable
trend. It does not afford a general measure for all cases.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented and he was joined by Justices Reed and
Harlan.89 They were concerned about the effects of the Winfield doctrine and the
trend toward expansive interpretation. Because of Winfield they wanted to be
cautious about extended coverage of railroad employees under the amendment of
1939. They would have restricted the amendment to those employees only who
are affected by the hazards of the railroad business. The answer to this objection
is one which cannot be developed here. It has been explored at length in other
publications. 40 The effects of Winfield must be confined to the case law of the
era before 1939 or the remedial effects of the amendment will be drastically
reduced.
There is no easy solution for these problems of interpretation. The meaning
of the Act of 1939 as to scope and coverage of possible claimants has been con-
ditioned by the anticipated effects of Winfield, and it has not been easy to persuade
judges that the Winfield doctrine can be confined to the 1939 case law.4 1 After
8 Lillie v. Thompson was a Supreme Court case (332 U.S. 459) but counsel did not
argue the question of scope nor did the Court discuss it.88 Reed v. Pennsylvania R., 227 F. (2) 810 (C. A. 3d, 1955).
30 Mr. Justice Burton dissented also for the reasons stated in the court of appeals.
40 Miller, An Interpretation of the Act of 1939 (FELA) 18 L. & C. P. 241, 251, 254
(1953); Miller, Workmen's Compensation for Railroad Employees, 2 LOYOLA L. REv. 138,
154-156 (1944).
4"The trend of the case law is one-sided. Except in Illinois [Thompson v. Industrial
Commission, 380 Ill. 386, 44 N.E. (2) 19 (1942)] in South Carolina [Boyleston v.
Southern Ry., 211 S. C. 232, 44 S. E. (2) 537 (1947)] and in a dissent in a New York
eighteen years judges are still working to discover the limits of the wider area
of the remedial statute, and they are trying to solve the problem of scope through
a case-by-case kind of administrative routine. It is a kind of routine on which
some lawmen thrive. Nevertheless, hairline distinctions and fine analogies about
interstate transportation and assumption of risk generated enough dissatisfaction
among lawmen of an earlier day that Congress enacted a remedial amendment.
On the whole the courts have responded well in administering the amended statute
to reduce the legalisms which were potent before 1939. That Congress supposed
the remedial effects of the amendment would be available for more railroad em-
ployees is obvious from a reading of the text and a reading of the committee
reports. That we are still having to struggle through another set of legalisms4 2
after a remedial amendment was adopted can mean that the whole scheme is
out of date.
Perhaps the area for adjustments and accommodations through statutory
interpretation of FELA is too unimportant to solicit much creative thinking toward
doctrinal development. The problems suggested by the legalisms of FELA are
common in other areas of tort. The fault concept as a basis for social responsibility
in an industrial society is obsolete. Lawyers have lived with the fictions and in-
congruities of the taught law of torts because the cruelties of the system are
tempered practically by doctrines like respondeat superior and res ipsa loquitur,
and by conditions like risk-shifting and administrative measuring through the
jury system.
Some day lawmen will have to reach for alternatives to fault in the casualty
field. Imaginative men will develop casualty adjustment schemes with trial rou-
tines sufficient to satisfy conventional requirements in state constitutions about
trial by jury.4" In the work-injury field a system is ready for re-shaping to the
railroad business. Workmen's compensation is conventional. For many lawyers
and many clients FELA as we know it serves useful functions, but we are begin-
ning to develop a new round of legalisms which we shall need legislation to
reduce. With Winfield in the background, remedial additions by amendment are
impossible. The statutory changes must be drastic. In this area that means work-
men's compensation for railroad employees.44
Appellate Division [Heffernon, J., in Wright v. New York Central R., 263 App. Div.
461, 463, 33 N. Y. S. (2) 531, 532 (1942)] all of the judges who have considered the
problem are agreed that the effects of Winfield must follow any extension of FELA. See
Miller, An Interpretation of the Act of 1939 (FELA), 18 L. & C. P. 241, 243-244.
42 The vice in the new round of legalisms is the Winfield doctrine. Paradoxically a
generous interpretation in the interest of injured employees as plaintiffs under the Act can
hurt the same kinds of employees who seek compensation under a state law.
43Cf. EHRENZWEIG, FULL AID INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICrIM (1954) (an
ingenious proposal for casualty problems in one area, including a voluntary insurance pro-
gram with supplementary legislation).
44 For other reasons than those suggested in this comment Mr. Justice Frankfurter
would substitute a compensation scheme for FELA. See his dissent in the three cases of
February 25, 1957 (see n. 16 supra) in 25 L. W. 4119.
